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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Marvin Gordon Grotto moved to suppress certain evidence obtained by law
enforcement after a search of the safe in his bedroom The district court denied his
motion. Mr. Grotto then entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to deliver. Mr. Grotto now appeals from the district court's
judgment of conviction, contending the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress because Mr. Grotto's consent to search the safe was involuntary.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously discussed
in Mr. Grotto's Appellant's Brief. They are not repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference.
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ISSUE

the district court err by denying Mr. Grotto's motion to suppress when Mr. Grotto's
to search the safe was involuntary based on the totality of the circumstances?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Grotto's Motion To Suppress Because
Mr. Grotto's Consent To Search The Safe Was Involuntary Based On The Totality Of
The Circumstances
As argued in Mr. Grotto's Appellant's Brief, the district court lacked substantial
and competent evidence to find Mr. Grotto voluntarily consented to the search of the
safe in his bedroom. His consent to search was not voluntary, but rather the product of
police coercion and duress when considering the totality of the circumstances.
As an initial matter, Mr. Grotto agrees with the State's assertion that he only
challenges the search of the safe in his bedroom. (Respt. Br., pp.7-8.) This was the
only issue raised by Mr. Grotto in his motion to suppress. (R., p.68.) The items found by
Officer Reimers during the search of the safe were drug paraphernalia and
methamphetamine. (R., p.67.)
Contrary to the State's arguments, however, Mr. Grotto is entitled to suppression
of these items because any consent to search the safe was involuntary. (See Res pt.
Br. pp.8-16.) Mr. Grotto takes issue with the State's assertion that his argument
"misstates the district court's decision and the evidence presented at the suppression
hearing." (Respt. Br. P.9.) Mr. Grotto simply contends that the district court's factual
findings regarding consent are unsupported by the evidence in the record, especially
the audio recording of the police investigation. For example, the audio recording shows
that Mr. Grotto informed the officers of his PSR worker multiple times throughout the
investigation. (State's Ex. 1, Audio CD ("Audio") 3:31-40, 3:47-55,

03-16, 5:35-39,

5:42-52, 8:23-35, 11 :45-49, 23:36-39.) Although the quality of the audio recording
makes it somewhat difficult to identify each and every statement made by Mr. Grotto

3

and the officers, a close listening of the recording reveals Mr. Grotto explicitly informing
the officers of his PSR worker many times.
This information provided by the audio recording is significant because the
district court "must" take into account "subtly coercive police tactics, as well as the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents." Schneckloth v.
Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,229 (1973); accord, e.g., State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848,852
(2001 ); State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 686 (Ct. App. 2011 ). Here, the district
court's discussion of Mr. Grotto's PSR worker demonstrates that the district court did not
properly consider the evidence of Mr. Grotto's vulnerable subjective state. The district
court determined Mr. Grotto's reference to his PSR worker was intended to explain
away the officers' allegations of criminal activity. (R., pp.72-73.) The district court also
determined Mr. Grotto's "ready response" demonstrated "considerable sophistication"
and an understanding of the situation. (R., p.72.) The error in the district court's finding
is that the district court failed to place this single reference to the PSR worker in context
of the entire investigation, which is necessary for a totality of the circumstances
analysis. It does not "strain credulity," as asserted by the State, to argue "the district
court's finding that Mr. Grotto referenced his PSR one time to explain away the
anonymous tip is clearly erroneous." (Respt. Br., p.1 0; App. Br., pp.16-17.) The district
court discussed one reference to a PSR worker. (R., pp.72-73.) Its recitation of the
facts also provides this single reference. (R., pp.64-68.) But, when listening to the audio
recording as a whole, it is clear that Mr. Grotto made multiple references to PSR
worker-not to mention the others statements by Mr. Grotto and his friend-to express
a lack of comprehension and duress in the situation. The district court made no specific
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mention of these other statements. Nor did the district court consider how these other
statements factored into Mr. Grotto's "possibly vulnerable subjective state" when he
consented to the search of the safe. The district court lacked substantial and competent
evidence for its findings on Mr. Grotto's mental health condition and how his condition
affected the voluntariness of his consent
What is more, the officers' testimony does not bolster any finding by the district
court on Mr. Grotto's subjective state. (See Respt. Br., pp.12-13, 14-15.) For example,
the nervousness and anxiety of Mr. Grotto, which was understood by the officers as an
indication of illegal activity, is equally indicative of duress and coercion. As an inquiry
into Mr. Grotto's subjective state, Mr. Grotto's statements on the audio recording should
be given more weight than the objective perceptions of the officers.
Mr. Grotto also takes issue with the State's contention that his argument
regarding revocation of consent is "illogical." (Respt. Br., p.15.) Mr. Grotto is not arguing
that he preemptively revoked consent to search the safe before he gave that consent.
Rather, he is arguing that the officers' disregard of his attempts to revoke his consent is
further evidence of the coercion and duress present when Mr. Grotto eventually gave in
to the search of the safe. The evidence shows Mr. Grotto tried to withdraw his consent
to search his home and bedroom. (Audio 6:17-43, 8:15-54, 13:58-14:06, 17:53-18:28.)
A typical reasonable person would have understood that Mr. Grotto wanted the officers
to end the search and leave his home by these exchanges. State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho
151, 154 (2004); State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 696 (1999). The officers did not leave
Mr. Grotto's home, however. The officers just continued to ask Mr. Grotto to consent to
the search until they got the answer they wanted. Mr. Grotto's attempts at revocation
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further demonstrate that the district court lacked substantial and competent evidence to
that Mr. Grotto's consent to search the safe was voluntary.
The State submits that the district court properly concluded:
[A]lthough police undoubtedly used sharp investigative tactics in order to
coax the defendant into consenting to the search of his bedroom safe, the
officers never strayed beyond the confines of the law (i.e. by coercing the
defendant's consent) in doing so, and hence the motion to suppress must
be denied.
(Respt. Br., pp.15-16; R., p.69.) Mr. Grotto disagrees. An officer's use of sharp
investigative tactics to coax a mentally-impaired and distressed individual to consent
after his repeated, but ignored, attempts at revocation is not within the confines of the
law. It is implied coercion. Mr. Grotto's consent was involuntary and thus the search of
the safe was unlawful.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Crotto respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's denial
of his motion to suppress. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the district court's order and remand his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 17 th day of November, 2015.
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